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The Next Big AI Breach Likely Won’t Start With Hackers

How “shadow AI” and poorly governed copilots are turning ordinary workflows into incident pipelines, and what security leaders can do in the next 90 days.

In the past year, companies rushed to bolt AI onto everything from customer support to even code review. Now, security teams are confronting an awkward pattern: some of the most expensive AI-related risks are being created inside the building, not by advanced attackers, but by employees, vendors, and “helpful” automation that nobody formally approved.

But now, security teams are waking up to a new kind of fire drill: self-inflicted AI risk, which, in this case, it's not related to a breach, no attacker, just a prompt, some sensitive data, and no guardrails in sight.

And this is where CISOs are facing a cold new truth: AI isn’t just a project. It’s production. And we need to start treating it like one, yesterday.

Self-Inflicted AI Risk: The Pattern for How AI Incidents Are Actually Happening in 2026

Here’s the behind-the-scenes playbook security leaders are seeing on repeat:

  1. A business unit spins up or experiments with a new AI tool outside formal review.
  2. Someone pastes sensitive data into prompts, uploaded into knowledge bases, or routed through an AI feature added by a vendor.
  3. The AI output is trusted too quickly, or an agent is granted broad permissions to “speed things up.”
  4. Something goes wrong, data leaks, improper access occurs, or an automated action triggers a customer-facing failure.

In many cases, there’s no dramatic intrusion. The “incident” is just a normal workflow plus one missing control.

The result is what boards care about most: brand damage, regulatory exposure, and that sick feeling in your stomach when you realize it all could’ve been avoided..

The Attack Surface No One's Mapping

Ask any org to list “all AI in use,” and you’ll get a partial list. A few approved copilots, maybe a vendor or two.

But the actual AI surface looks more like this:

  • Copilots embedded in email, docs, and ticketing tools
  • Third-party AI quietly embedded in your SaaS stack
  • Internal apps pinging model APIs in the background
  • Plugins, browser extensions, agents running unchecked
  • Data sets powering retrieval systems (knowledge bases, RAG)
  • AI-enabled workflows that read/write to sensitive systems

If that sounds like a lot, that’s because it is. AI is beyond single app sets, it’s a tangled web of models, data, and permissions, that very often, no one’s really tracking.

The 3 AI Failure Modes Security Teams Keep Running Into

Security teams keep circling three recurring trouble spots:

1) Prompt Injection: Bad instructions get buried in good content, (emails, PDFs, tickets, etc.). The model reads it, freaks out, ignores rules, and suddenly reveals data or takes weird actions. It’s sneaky. And it works.

2) Rogue Agent Actions: Agents that can take actions (send emails, modify records, open tickets, run scripts) become risky fast when permissions are too broad or instructions are ambiguous.

3) Data Leakage: Sensitive info slips out through prompts, logs, outputs, or integrations. And since nobody’s monitoring model behavior deeply enough, it often goes unnoticed until it’s too late.

None of these require a zero-day or nation-state attackers. Just bad defaults, missing policies, and a false sense of “it’ll probably be fine.

Resolution #1: Treat AI Like It’s Already in Production (Because It Is)

If there is one practical takeaway from Resolution #1 (from our Top 5 cyber security resolutions for 2026) let it be this:

Inventory it. Govern it. Secure it end-to-end.
Not as a special project. Not as a one-time policy. As production.

That means building an AI security and governance baseline using an AI Security Platform approach, a consolidated control layer that covers:

  • Continuous discovery of internal + third-party AI
  • Risk scoring based on data + action access
  • Policy controls for prompt handling + output behavior
  • Guardrails for workflows and automated actions
  • Testing for prompt injection + leakage vulnerabilities
  • Monitoring that actually understands model usage
  • Vendor onboarding checks for AI capabilities

Because here’s the truth is: fragmented controls = shadow AI. And shadow AI? That’s how stuff breaks

What the Board Actually Cares About (Hint: It’s Not Your Model Choice)

Boards don’t care about transformer architectures or the ethics of AGI. They care about risk and ROI. So when they ask:

Can we use AI to grow without blowing up?”

Your answer should be: Yes, but only if it’s governed.

Security’s job is to make AI investable, auditable, controlled, and measurable, so the organization can move forward with confidence instead of fear, understanding that when AI spend gets scrutinized, security can unblock ROI.

The real win? Showing you can approve AI faster by proving it’s controlled. Show discovery coverage. Show guardrails. Show fewer incidents. That’s what unblocks ROI, and earns security a seat at the AI table.

[Download a "quick wins" 90-day plan - No Mythical "AI Strategy" Required]


TL;DR?
AI risk isn’t coming. It’s here. And a lot of it is coming from inside the house. Treating AI like production is your best chance to stay ahead from your own internal chaos (and attackers as well).